Firm News

Dog Attack Injures 2, Kills Smaller Dog
Posted on 3/17/2009
A Recipe for Dog Bite Injuries: Kids, Dogs and Warm Weather
Posted on 3/17/2009
Parent of dog bite victim wants tougher animal control measures
Posted on 3/17/2009
Deadly dog attacks: only one common denominator
Posted on 3/17/2009
Infant killed in dog attack
Posted on 3/16/2009

Library

General

Owner Liability

Under the dog bite statute, an owner is strictly liable. There is no definition, however, of "owner." Therefore one must look to the court decisions to determine who will be regarded as a dog's owner in any particular case.
In Harris v. Turner, 1 Wn. App. 1023, 466 P.2d 202, review denied, 78 Wn.2d 993 (1970), a running dog collided with a moving motorcycle. The injured passenger received a jury verdict against the dog owners and the owners of the property on which the dog owners lived. A Pierce County code provision defined "owner" as "any person, firm or corporation owning, having interest in or having control or custody or possession of any animal." A subsequent provision provided that it was unlawful for any owner to "keep, harbor, or maintain" a vicious dog. The court held the ownership of a house in which the dog owners resided did not make the property owners the owners, harborers, or keepers of the dog. Harris, at 1028.

Shafer v. Beyers, 26 Wn. App. 442, 446, 613 P.2d 554, review denied, 94 Wn.2d 1018 (1980) is a badly reasoned decision that states the issue one way but bases the holding on something entirely different. In that case, it was held that a property owner was not liable for a dog owned by a person subletting an apartment on the property. The property owners did not live in the city where the accident happened, the people who had custody of the dog were not the original tenants but rather were sub-tenants, and it was unclear whether the sub-tenants were the owners of the dog or simply the temporary keepers of the dog.

The court said that "[o]ne ultimate issue is presented," and stated the issue in the following manner: "Are the owners of rental property (who do not live on the rented premises) liable for injuries sustained by a pedestrian while passing by the premises on a public sidewalk, which injuries were caused by a dog kept on the premises by a subtenant of the tenant to whom the premises were rented?"

Illogically, the court's decision was based not upon any definition of "owner," but on the complete absence of proof that the dog exhibited dangerous tendencies prior to the date of the accident. "We have carefully reviewed the record presented and it does not establish that the landlords knew or had reason to know that Nojo was a dangerous animal." Shafer, 26 Wn. App. at 448.

So the real issue did not depend upon the status of the defendants as landlords, owner, harborers or keepers, but rather upon whether anyone had knowledge of the dangerous propensity of the dog. Ultimately the Shafer case simply reiterated the common law rule that a person's liability for the injuries inflicted by a domestic animal is based on that person's scienter of the dangerousness.

In Beeler v. Hickman, 50 Wn. App. 746; 750 P.2d 1282; 1988 Wash. App. LEXIS 129 (1988), the appellate court reversed the summary judgment granted in favor of the defendants because it found that ownership of the dog, for purposes of imposing strict liability under the applicable statute, was an unresolved issue of material fact. The case therefore establishes that ownership is a factual issue to be determined by a jury when there is any evidence to support the view that the defendant might be an owner of the dog in question.

The Hickmans contended there was no genuine issue of material fact as to ownership because it was undisputed their granddaughter, Mrs. Layman, purchased the dog, never relinquished ownership, intended to get possession of him in the future, and the Hickmans denied ownership. However, the fact the Hickmans resided with, cared for, and had exclusive possession of the dog for 3 years was held to raise a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to decide. Furthermore, the court reasoned that since these allegations were particularly within the knowledge of the Hickmans and Mrs. Layman, summary judgment would not be proper. The court cited Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Olson, 44 Wn. App. 898, 905, 723 P.2d 438, review denied, 106 Wn.2d 1011 (1986).

Beeler held that "[t]he use of the term 'owner' evidences a legislative intent to exclude from liability persons who are mere keepers or possessors of a dog." Beeler, 50 Wn. App. at 752. The court rejected the argument that ownership is limited to purchasers, concluding that the Legislature must have intended to include persons who reside with and care for a dog for an extended period of time. Beeler, 50 Wn. App. at 752. Based on evidence that the defendants in that case had resided with, cared for, and exclusively possessed the dog for three years, the Beeler court concluded there was an issue of fact regarding ownership.

Blog

General

view all